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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION

On 23 September 1985, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) formed
the Unified Space Command (USSPACECOM) with headquarters in
Colorado Springs, Colorado. The components of the new command
are the Air Force Space Command, the Naval Space Command, and
Army Element. General Robert T. Herres was named Commander-in-the
Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) which began
deactivation after formation of USSPACECOM. 1
The missions of ADCOM were divided between USSPACECOM and
the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Those
ADCOM missions reassigned to USSPACECOM are Attack Warning/Attack
Assessment and Space Defense, renamed Space Control. Space
Support, a previously unassigned space operation, was also
assigned to CINC USSPACECOM or CINCSPACE.
Formation of USSPACECOM is an acknowledgement of the extent
to which the National Command Authorities (NCA) and worldwide
air, land, sea, and other space operational forces depend on the
missions which space systems perform. CINCSPACE is responsible
through the JCS to the NCA for conducting effective military
space operations and integrating them into the military
operations of the traditional forces. Space operations,
therefore, will become more responsive to NCA direction and
the operational needs of the unified and specified CINCs. 2 to
The JCS tasked CINCSPACE TO "maintain assured access to
use of space for the U.S. and her allies at all times." 3 Theand
purpose of this paper is to examine that task. What are the
basic elements of space operations? How important are they? Is
there a threat? If so, are U.S. space systems and operations
strong enough to survive in the face of a determined effort to
defeat them?
SECTION II
ACCESS TO AND USE OF SPACE

The idea of access to and use of space involves terms
concepts which require discussion. Chief among these are and
space
systems, space operations, and space missions. Space systems
and
space operations are the tools and activities required to perform
space missions. Space missions are the services or functions
which space systems provide to national and military users
worldwide. In other words, space missions are the "...users.,. 11
of space, while space systems and operations represent
11 .. .access. . , lf to it.
SPACE SYSTEMS
Any system which includes, supports, or is directed at an
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earth orbiting satellite is a space system. Satellites,
spacetrack sensors, the Space Shuttle, expendable boosters, upper
stages, anti-satellite weapons, and a myriad of facilities and
air, land, and sea equipment are all space systems. The primary
space systems exists because there are satellites. It is the
earth orbiting satellite which actually exploits the uses of
near-earth space in support of terrestrial forces.
Basically, satellites are composed of a platform and a
payload. The platform contains all support subsystems required
to serve the payload. These subsystems include the structure,
automatic data processing, communications, electrical power,
telemetry, orbit control, and attitude control. In addition,
manned satellites contain life support and man-interface
subsystems.
Military satellite payloads fall into one of four categories:
sensor, communications relay, positional reference, and, in the
future, weapons. A satellite's payload determines its mission.
Some satellites have more that one payload. Some of these have
more than one mission.
Whether it be one or many, the entire number of a particular
kind of satellite performing a specific function or mission is
referred to as a satellite constellation. Some satellite systems
or the missions they serve are actually systems or
constellations. Frequently, for example, an information
collection constellation will relay information through a
communications relay constellation.
Constellations are supported by launch and deploy facilities
and vehicles, satellite control facilities, payload control or
processing facilities, and recovery systems. These are referred
to in this paper as earth support systems.
Space launch systems are the space launch vehicles and the
facilities from which they are launched. Launch vehicles are
more or less complex depending upon whether they are manned or
unmanned, reusable or expendable, and upon how heavy a load they
must carry how high.
The major launch facilities are located at Kennedy Space
Center, Florida and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. There
is also a small facility at Wallop's Island, Virginia. Kennedy
and Vandenberg have 14 launch complexes between them. 4 Launch
complexes include not only the gantries form which the luanches
occur, but also associated tracking, control and support
facilities. Launch facilities represent ports of access to
space.
U.S. space systems represent some of this country's most
advanced technologies. They are unsurpassed in capability,
sophistication, and longevity, however, Col Robert Griffin,
author of u.s SPACE SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY, states that U.S space
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systems "... are frequently capable of 'gee whiz' performance,
but are often complex and expensive." 5 Capability,
sophistication, and longevity are expensive and require snail
constellations with low replenishment production rates for
satellites, boosters, and upper stages. While this nay appeal to
a cost accountant in peacetime, it has alarming implications to
military operators and users confronted by satellite attrition in
crisis or conflict.
SPACE OPERATIONS

Space operations are categorized as either space support
operations or space control operations.
Space support operations are those activities required to
tend or support satellite systems and include luanch, satellite
control, and recovery. The purpose of space launch operations
is to place satellites into orbit. DOD space launch operations
are complex. DOD Space Shuttle launch operations are conducted
in cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The Air Force is the executive agent for
DOD space launches, shuttle or otherwise. 6
Air Force Systems
Command executes Air Force launch responsibilities through its
Space Division. Space Division, which is operationally
responsive to USSPACECOM, conducts space launch activities
primarily with an extensive network of commercial contractors.
The purpose of satellite control is to assure that satellite
payloads are functioning properly and are programmed as required.
Some satellite systems have dedicated control activities for
these purposes. Others are controlled by the common user network
called the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN). The Air
Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF) at Onizuka Air Force
Base, California plus seven Remote Tracking Stations (RTS) around
the world make up the common user network. Additionally, the
Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) at Falcon Air Force
Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado is taking on many
responsibilities now carried by AFSCF and will provide
redundancy.? Further, another RTS will be located on the CSOC
complex. Whether dedicated or common user, satellite control
operations depend on many nodes or "choke points" of activity.
Destruction of these nodes is system fatal.
Space recovery operations have yet to be fully defined, but
will include the recovery of orbiting objects for operational or
logistical reasons and the recovery and turnaround of reusable
vehicles such as the space shuttle.
Space control operations include spacetrack, protection, and
negation.
The purpose of spacetrack is to detect, track, and catalogue
all man made objects in earth orbit. USSPACECOM radar and
optical Sensors around the world relay more that 45,000 daily
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observations on approximately 7000 orbiting objects to the Space
Surveillance Center (SSC) in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, 8 Based
on this data, the SSC computes past, present, and future location
of on-orbit satellites for various purposes and users,
Spacetrack data and computations are fundamental for space
operations.
CINCSPACE conducts space protection operations through the
Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC) also in Cheyenne
Mountain. Space protection includes assessing all-source data to
determine if hostilities in space are imminent or taking place,
advising/ warning satellite owners/operators of such assessments,
and, in the future, countering and defeating attacks against U.S.
space systems.
CINCSPACE will also conduct space negation operations through
the SPADOC when and if weapons are'developed for that purpose.
Negation operations do not fit into this discussion of access to
and. use of space. They are mentioned here only to complete the
list of space control operations.
SPACE MISSIONS

Space Missions are the services that spacecraft provide for
DOD forces. 'They may be categorized as either force enhancement
or force applications. 9 Force enhancement missions are combat
support in, nature and. include communications, surveillance,
reconnaissance r navigation, meteorology, and geodesy. 1 ° Force
application, are direct combat operations which might employ
earth-to-space, space-to-space, or space-to-earth weapons.
Space based seasons are the only systems capable of providing
continuous, complete surveillance of the oceans and the Asian
land mass to warn of sea and land launched ballistic missiles.
This warning is a critical element in guaranteeing that U.S.
strategic retaliatory forces will not be caught and destroyed by
surprise.
Reconnaissance and intelligence have always been critical
elements of mililtary opeations. The more reliable and timely
the intelligence, the more valuable it is. Satellites in earth
orbit are uniquely situated to gain routine and detailed
observations of enemy positions at full depth.

'Communications nay be the most important activity conducted
in crisis and conflict. Emergency action messages, command and
coat rol f I nte1 1i gence, and logistics traffic mu s t c on t i nue
unimpeded and secure from interception to assure that forces are
deployed, employed, informed, and supported when and where
needed. Seventy percent, of long haul communications pass through
'
'
at least one satellite relay enroute. 11

Aside from communications, soldiers, sailors, and airmen
routinely from space based navigation
directly
benefit

and meteorology systems. The accuracies associated with NAVSTAR
Global Positioning System significantly improves navigation,
geopositioning, and targeting. "Consider how important a
meteorological satellite... would have been to General Dwight D.
Elsenhower in June 1944". 12 Throughout history weather has
intervened in military operations positively or negatively on a
tactical or strategic scale. Sufficient information to
accurately predict weather would allow strategists and tacticians
to exploit conditions rather that be their victims.
Force applications space missions may be space oriented as
with earth-to-space or space-to-earth systems. These could be
used defensively to protect U.S. satellites under attack or
offensively to negate enemy satellites, such systems could also
be used to defeat missiles in flight in a missile defense role.
Earth oriented space weapons may provide new, more effective ways
to perform air or sea supremacy missions, interdiction., close
support, or suppression.
, When force applications missions can be performed effectively
by space systems, then it will be true of space what Major Billy
Hitchell said of air power in 1917: "A cardinal principle in
warefare (is that ) a decision in the air must be sought and
obtained before a decision on the ground can be reached. 1113 Look
down/shoot down spacecraft will not be invincible, but they will
have a profound advantage over terrestrial forces. Mature
technologies of the type which the President's Space Defense
Initiative promises will be able to destroy not only missiles and
spacecraft, but also aircraft, ships, equipment, and facilities
on, earth.
Force enhancement missions cannot affect military operations
as directly as force applications, but they have become critical
in their own right. Well trained and disciplined military forces
are able to fight effectively as individual units, but they must
be able to group and attack the enemy when and where he is weak
or vulnerable. Timely reconnaissance and surveillance and
reliable and secure communications are required for this*
especially at the campaign or theater levels of action,
Moreover, the effectiveness of such attacks must be enhanced by
accurate navigation and targeting and must not be stalled by
weather conditions which could have been avoided or exploited*
SECTION 111
THE THREAT

U«S* military forces have grown to depend on the support that
space systems provide. It is a mistake, however, to take
granted that space systems will be there whenever needed, for
Thtrt
is a threat, The Soviets will attack U.S. space system* in
crisie or conflict. It is consistent with their doctrine f with
the fact 0'£ their weapons development, and with reason.
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'The tone of Soviet military doctrin is captured by Col A.A.
Sidorenko, Doctor of Military Science, in the introduction to his
book The Of fen s_iye; "...only the offensive leads to the
attainment of victory over the enemy/" 14 The Defense
Intelligence Agency suggests that "Space Supremacy" is what the
Soviets will seek in order to prevail on "Space Warefare". 15
Space Supremacy is defined as a "*..situation in which the
military space systems of one side have decisive superiority over
the systems of the other side". 16 The methods to such an end are
described in the Soviet Military Enclycopedia under "Antispace
Defense 11 . "Antispace Defense can be thus accomplished through
such means as builiding satellite sensors, jamming
communications, and destruction of ground installations as well
as destruction of the spacecraft itself". 17
The state of Soviet space weapons developments suggests that
the above doctrinal statements are more than mere academic
definitions. The Soviet Union already has an operational
antisatellite (ASAT) weapon. The 1985 edition.of Soviet Military
Power describes numerous space weapons developments including
ground based and airborne lasers, neutral particle beam weapons,
high energy mircrowave, and high velocity impact weapons. 18
Aside from the doctrinal statements and the implications of their
weapons development, it stands to reason that the Soviets will
attack U.S. space systems in crisis or conflict. They would gain
more than they would risk. Figure 1 below poses the four
possibilities with respect to the wartime operational status of
U.S. and USSR space systems and assesses the relative advantage
of each.
i
U.S.

USSR

1.

OP

NON OP

U.S.

2.

OP

OP

PARITY

3.

NON OP

NON OP

USSR

4.

WON OP

OP

USSR

ADVANTAGE

Figure 1
Relative Advantages
In line 1, the U.S. has wartime advantages because its space
systems are operational but Soviets' are not.
Line 2 suggests that the U.S. and Soviets sustained their own
space operations. Despite the earlier discussion of the
technological superiority of U.S. space systems, the assessment
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in line 2 is "Parity". There are two reasons. First, Soviet
space systems may be less capable than those of the U.S., but
that is not to say that they are inadequate. Second, Soviet
space systems are designed to perform specific military functions
and are not required to perform the mulitple or non-military
tasks as is usually the case in U.S. space systems. Soviet
Deputy Minister of Defense, Admiral Gorshkov is credited with
having said, "Better is the enemy of good enough". 19 No matter
how much better U.S. space systems might be, Soviet space systems
are good enough.
Line 3 represents a devastating ASAT campaign by both sides
after which neither side has operational space systems left. The
Soviets have the advantage for three reasons. First, the Soviets
depend on their space systems less than U.S. forces do. 20
The probable location of a future conflict will be closer to the
USSR that to the U.S., thus long haul satellite communications
will not be as critical to Soviet forces as to those of the U.S..
Moreover, the Soviets save older systems rather than discard
them, thus contributing to their depth. Second, while Soviet
forces have real numerical superiority, it is U.S. forces that
need force multiplication* Attribution on both sides favors the
larger forces. Third, the Soviets will start the war and,
therefore, will have the advantage of the initial offensive.
Offensive forces certainly rely on communications, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, but not to the extent that a defending
smaller force must.
Line 4 is the reverse of line 1 and the Soviets have the
advantage.
If one accepts the above as representative, then it is
clearly to the Soviets' advantage to attack U.S. space systems
even if their own is lost in the process. The worst result they
face for the attempt is the parity of line 2. If they are
confident in their launch reserve to fill attrition losses, they
can optimistically expect the advantage in line 4.
The Soviets will attack U.S. space systems as soon as they
have decided that conflict with the U.S. is necessary and
unavoidable.
WHAT U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS WILL BE ATTACKED?

With unlimited resources, Soviet leaders would destroy all
U.S. space capabilities. Each lost U.S. mission would have a
debilitating effect on the forces which depended upon it. They
will not have unlimited resources, so they must establish
priorities.
Earlier, communications, reconnaissance, and surveillance
were said to be critical force enhancement space missions.
Generally, any critical capability for one side is a critical
target for the other. The Soviets will have delivered a severe
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blow if they are able to deny the United States use of its
reconnaissance , surveillance, and communications satellites.
Early warning surveillance satellites, however, fall into a
different category of consideration. Certainly the missions they
perform are critical. Their loss would degrade the survivability
of strategic retaliatory forces. But Soviet attacks, or even
suspicion of such attacks, against early warning systems would
alert U.S. forces and possibly drive them to preemptive strikes.
The potential consequences of attacking U.S. early warning
systems outweigh the benefits.
HOW WILL U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS BE ATTACKED?

Space systems can be defeated by attacking the satellite
constellation, its earth support system, or both. The methods
for destroying earth support systems are not new. As a matter of
fact, they are all too simple. Unconventional forces, sleeper
agents, and surrogate terrorists can destroy satellite control
stations, launch sites, or user processing facilities using small
arms, plastic explosives, incendiaries, biological/chemical
agents, trucks, automobiles, or airplanes. Such forces and
attacks would be hard to detect and defend against.
Destroying satellite control stations and user processing
facilities would force satellite platforms and payloads to go
untended. Some systems, such as communications satellites, would
degrade gracefully. Sooner or later, however, they would drift
out of attitude or orbit limits and become useless. The
degradation would be more abrupt on other satellites which
require frequent and periodic programming. They would come to
the end of their last programmed activity and cease to perform
their mission. "The worst case is a low altitude reconnaissance
satellite that requires both frequent command and control and a
great deal of processing to get the reconnaissance information,
into usable form." 21
Destroying launch sites augments as ASAT campaign. As the
ASAT attacks destroy on-orbit capability, launch site destruction
prevents replacement from the earth. Striking launch sites would
be an effective way of separating an enemy from his reserves.
The advantages of attacking earth support systems are
simplicity, covertness, and multiplicity of effects. Simple
weapons and methods against a few well selected earth support
targets can be broadly effective in degrading space missions.
Further, enemy actions in the form of sabotage or terrorism might
be hard to distinguish from the civil turmoil which likely will
accompany the crisis at hand. Finally, successful attacks
against launch and satellite control facilities would produce
collateral or spillover impacts on all satellites dependent on
those facilities for support.
There are also advantages in attacking satellite
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constellations. The space segment may be the most vulnerable
target in the system. Destroying a two or three satellite
constellation in low orbit will be a relatively immediate and
permanent way of denying a space mission capability. There is no
graceful degradation to a space mission when the constellation is
destroyed. Finally, destroying satellites somewhere in orbit
will unlikely raise public ire as much as destroying a shuttle on
the pad or any other facility in the U.S. with full media
coverage. This may be an important consideration during a crisis
before hostilities begin.
Anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) fall into three categories;
kinetic energy weapons (KEWs), directed energy weapons (DEWs),
and electronic warfare weapons (EWs). 22 Any of these can be
mounted on mobile or fixed land, sea, or air platforms. In the
future, they will also be mounted on satellites. A single weapon
at a fixed location will have as few as two windows of
opportunity per day against a low orbit target simply because
that is how often the target crosses the area of weapons control.
More proliferated, geographically dispersed systems or mobile
systems increase those windows of opportunity. The best of all
worlds would be proliferated air, land, sea, and space mounted
weapons.
The only operational ASAT in the world is a Soviet KEW, the
orbital ASAT. Employing a space booster, it achieves an orbit
from which it can overtake and fire a single shot of pellets at
its target. 23 The U.S. developmental air launched ASAT is also a
KEW. It is launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft, not into
orbit, but on a direct ascent course to intercept its target.
KEWs could also be mounted on small boosters or on satellites.
The time duration between attack initiation and culmination can
be an important consideration with KEWs. If the ASAT requires an
hour or more of pursuit, the target can evade destruction
provided it is configured and adequately warned to do so. It is
even conceivable that a KEW ASAT could itself be destroyed in
flight by space protection forces. Barring such an anti-ASAT
development, the final results of a KEW ASAT campaign would
depend on whether the ASAT attacks could be sustained longer than
the target constellation could evade.
DEWs will strike targets at the speed of light and will thus
eliminate time duration considerations. If these weapons can
deliver enough energy to catastrophically destroy satellites,
then the attacker will indeed have the advantage.
EWs can be employed to interfere with or otherwise impair
satellite operations. Electronic jamming could be employed
against satellite or earth support receivers to prevent uplinks
or downlinks respectively. Except for some rare cases where a
satellite was critically dependent on an uplink or downlink to or
from a particular satellite control station, the effect of
jamming satellite command and control links seems to be very
transient and non-lethal. The most effective EW jamming would be
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against geostationary communications satellites. Effective
jamming of a sufficient number of satellites would critically
re d'Uce communi cat i on s wor1dwi d e .
The most likely Soviet strategy would be to combine attacks
against earth support and satellite constellations of a few
selected space missions. The missions selected would be those
considered, most threatening to Soviet forces or. most debilitating
to U*S, forces* The combined effect of such an attack on all
fronts would be their best bet for denying the U.S. use of its
space resources.
SECTION IV
ASSURING ACCESS TO AND USE OF SPACE

The JCS tasked CINCSPACE to "maintain assured access to and
use of space at all times." This is an imperative which stands
during peace as well as national crisis. The discussion in
Section II listed the elements of access to and use of space, but
the tasking included the words "...maintain assured..." and
"...at all times...." These words require determination. U.S.
space systems must survive a determined Soviet attack. The
published material available on space system survivability and
endurability can be reduced to three concepts: systemic
survivability, protection, and reserve strength and flexibility.
SYSTEMIC SURVIVABILITY

Systemic survivability is the capability inherent in a
system's design or configuration to survive damage or component
failure. No space system is invulnerable, but certain features
of design or deployment minimize the danger and effect of damage.
In his book, Col Giffen lists the following features which
enhance systemic survivability: hardening, autonomy, and
mobility and maneuverability. 4 In different ways, they apply to
both the earth support system and the satellite constellation.
Self contained power generation systems, protected air and
water supplies, and bunkered or underground facilities are but a
few examples of earth support physical hardening. Protected
electronics and jam-resistant communications will keep the
facility functioning within its system. Air, land, and sea
mobile platforms provide flexibility and proliferation which add
to the survivability of a system.
These and other hardening features are being applied to many
existing and future earth support systems, in some cases at
considerable cost. Other systems, however, do not lend
themselves to hardening. To harden launch facilities, for
example, would require new concepts for booster and satellite
design. Systemic survivability also applies to spacecraft and their
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constellations. Electronic and physical shielding will prevent
some levels of damage to sensitive components. Jam-resistant and
encrypted communications links will keep the system operating
without interference from hostile radio electronic combat. A
satellite which can maneuver frequently and on command is an
elusive target for KEWs in flight. Contingency maneuvers when
approaching active, hostile DEWs will increase survivability when
running those gauntlets. Higher orbits are safer than lower
ones.
Booster throw weight is precious. For every pound of
spacecraft weight devoted to survivability, a pound of mission
capability is left behind. Spacecraft fuel for maneuverability
is not only heavy, but it is limited. Sooner or later the
spacecraft will exhaust its fuel, lose mission capability, and
become an easy target. Some missions can be performed from high
orbit, but others cannot.
The measures above can add to the survivability of some space
systems, but they alone cannot give needed assurances.
PROTECTION

CINCSPACE is responsible for the space protection operations,
but space protection is still in its infancy. Basic
responsibilities remain unclear. CINCSPACE provides advisories
and warnings of space hostilities to space systems owners/
operators through the SPADOC. Beyond that, he may provide active
satellite defense if that kind of capability is developed. But,
who is responsible to secure earth support facilities? The host
military organization is responsible for tenants on military
reservations. Normal security protection nay not be sufficient
in the face of determined, clandestine operations. Further, who
is responsible for those earth support facilities not on military
reservations, such as Kennedy or Johnson Space Centers?
As the world order degrades in some hypothetical future
crisis, critical earth support facilities must be guarded.
Effective contingency plans to secure these facilities from a
variety of air, land, and sea attacks must be in place. This
kind of protection, however, is difficult at best. Consider the
difficulty of securing the Kennedy or Vandenberg launch complexes
for example. Serious difficulties exist, as well, in securing
remote satellite control stations spread around the world.
To be effective, assessments and warnings of attacks against
satellite constellations must be made early enough to allow
contingency actions. However, the assessment process can be
slow. It depends on all-source intelligence information, on
detailed satellite status information from owners/operators, and
on spacetrack data from the spacetrack network. 25 Analysis of
this information must produce sufficient evidence to distinguish
between an unfortunate, but not uncommon satellite failure and a
deliberate, destructive attack. Warnings must then be
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transmitted to all satellite operators and to the NCA as quickly
as possible. There is no tangible protection in this unless the
warning keys the operator to execute systemic shielding or

evasive actions.
It has been suggested that an antisatellite system similar to
the P-15 air launched ASAT would protect U.S. space sytstems by
detering Soviet ASAT attacks. 26 This logic is unclear. The
discussion of Figure 1 in Section III suggested that the Soviets
would gain an overall advantage by destroying U.S. satettites,
even if their own were destroyed in the process. However, a
fundamental prerequisite for deterrence is that "...the enemy
must value and rely on his space systems as much more than, you
do,..." 27 The F-15 air launched ASAT would not deter Soviet
ASATs any more than the F-15 fighter itself would deter Soviet
Migs.

There will not be any real protection of U.S. satellites
until protection forces have the capability to destroy Soviet
ASAT weapons* KEWs could be destroyed in flight by advanced DEWs
for example* As difficult as that would be, that is the easy
case. What about weapons which attack too quickly to be
destroyed in flight? What about DEWs, EWs, or hypervelocity
weapons based in the Soviet Union, where to destroy the weapon
would be to attack the Soviet homeland. Soviet ASAT facilities
would undoubtedly be damaged or destroyed during a central
nuclear exchange, but it was suggested earlier that Soviet ASAT
activity could be expected much earlier than, that* A decision, to
attack facilities within the Soviet Union during a serious crisis
or conflict would have grave implications, yet not doing so, or
deciding to do so too slowly, would result in the loss of
critical satellites or even constellations.
STRONG 1MB FLEXIBLE RESERVE

Despite efforts to develop survivable space systems and
effective protection systems and operations* critical space
systems are too few to escape significant, loss in conflict.
Space system survibability efforts must Include the ability to
replace attrition, losses with strong and flexible reserves*

Redundant, proliferated facilities and mobile earth support
platforms provide reserve and flexibility to sustain space
operations. Civil satellite operations could provide reserve
satellite control and user processing facilities If agreements
which allow commercial cargo aircraft to augment DOD airlift in
emergencies might serve as examples* Compatibility and incentive
issues could be worked out*
In space, large constellations provide inherent reserves*
Sotte orbits, usually high orbits* allow the luxury of on~orbit
satellite" sparing, ' Not all satellites fly in high orbits nor in
large conste111at ions however. Many fly in small constellations
at low altitudest These depend on reserves which must be

launched from. Kennedy or Vandenberg when needed.
Each space launch, Space Shuttle or otherwise, represents
end of a lengthy and carefully phased pipeline which may have the
begun years earlier with-booster and satellite procurement
programming. Ideally, booster and satellite launch ready dates
coincide with operational need dates. While this scheme has
served the practical concerns of cost effectiveness very well, it
provides little or no ready reserve for premature failure, or,
more to the point, attrition.
SECTION V

CONCLUSION

Space systems perform critical space missions for the MCA and
U.S. military forces in peace, but especially in crisis and
conflict,. Admiral James D, Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations,
stated, during the May 1985 Naval Space,, symposium at the Naval
Post Graduate Schoo1:
Our ability to maintain sea control will be in jeopardy
without space control. Our capability to win the battle
of the first salvo will not be determined solely by our
performance within the classic three dimensions of the
terrestrial ocean, environment. Rather, it will be
determined by the way we use all four dimensions - air,
s e a, u nd e1 r s e a, a nd s p a c e.
Ma jor Ge nera1 Rober t A. Ro s e nbe rg, Director, Defense Mappi
Agency and former Vice CINCNORAD, wrote, "The simple fact is ng
...that advantage is dependent on our exploration of space for
the support o f our fo rces." 2 8
Further, General .Rosen.berg asks, "At what point can. an
adversary engage American forces and not afford to hold
sate11i tes a t r i sk?" 2 9
The United States and the Soviet Union could be drawn, to the
brink of conflict by conditions which neither side could
completely control. If conflict appeared unavoidable to Soviet
leaders, they would direct their space forces to attack the most
critical U.S. space systems.

U.S. space systems must servive such an attack to enhance
and multiply the effectiveness of terrestrial forces* To
survive/ they must be capable and rugged, but that is not enough.
No space system is unvulnerable. Earth support systems as well
as satellites .must be protected. Forces and strategies
be
developed to put teeth into space protection concepts in must
order to
defeat' attacks and suppress enemy ASATs. Even with survivability
features and protection forces, considerable U.S. space systems
will be struck and destroyed during a conflict. They are too
important and there are too few of then to expect otherwise.

Reserve capability must be available to replace losses.
are ways to do it.

There

Maintain assured access to and use of space at all times.
Take the high ground and hold it. This is the task of CINCSPACE.
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